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SCOPE OF THE "LEGAL, VALID AND BINDING" OPINION OF
FOREIGN COUNSEL

The heart of a legal opinion customary in the United States is counsel's statement that the agreement in question is "legal, valid, binding
and enforceable in accordance with its terms." If in an international
* Michael Gruson (LL.B. 1962, University of Mainz, Germany, M.C.L. 1963, and
LL.B. 1965, Columbia University, and Dr. jur. 1966, Freie Universitit Berlin) is a
partner of Shearman & Sterling and a member of the New York bar. Michael Kutschera
(Mag. and Dr. jur. 1979, University of Vienna, Austria and M.C.J. 1983, New York
University) is an associate of Shearman & Sterling and a member of the New York bar.
This article is based on a presentation made by Michael Gruson on October 1, 1985,
in Singapore before the Committee on Banking Law of the International Bar Association. A Subcommittee on Legal Opinions of the Committee on Banking Law chaired by
Michael Gruson presented a multi-country study and report on responses by non-United
States counsel to opinion requests by United States counsel at the 21st Biennial Conference of the International Bar Association in New York in September 1986. See Subcommittee on Legal Opinions of Committee E of the Section on Business Law of the International Bar Association, Response to U.S. Opinion Requests, a Report on Legal Opinions
in International Transactions (M. Gruson, Reporter & M. Kutschera, Co-Reporter)
(unpublished manuscript 1986) [hereinafter Response to U.S. Opinion Requests].
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transaction United States counsel requests an opinion from foreign counsel, United States counsel will request foreign counsel to include such a
statement in the opinion even when the agreement in question provides
that the governing law of the contract shall be the law of the home state
of United States counsel. United States counsel and foreign counsel may
endlessly discuss the meaning of such an opinion if it relates to an agreement governed by a law which the foreign opining lawyer is not licensed
to practice." This article analyzes the meaning behind the incantation
and suggests that the opinion requested from foreign counsel be phrased
in a way which expresses the true meaning, rather than the traditional
formulation. In other words, it is suggested that the "legal, valid, binding
and enforceable" formula be demystified and that foreign counsel be encouraged to call a spade a spade.
To understand the scope of these statements by foreign counsel take as
an example a loan agreement, expressly governed by New York law,
between a New York bank, represented by New York counsel as principal counsel, and a non-United States borrower and the opinion to be
rendered with respect to that loan agreement by a lawyer admitted to
practice in the country of the borrower (the "foreign counsel"). It makes
no difference whether foreign counsel is borrower's counsel or lender's
local counsel.
The opinion of foreign counsel, that a New York agreement is "legal,
valid, binding and enforceable in accordance with its terms," if read together with the usual express or implied qualification, that his opinion is
rendered only under his country's law2 (the "foreign law"), means that
the governing law clause contained in the agreement is valid under the
foreign law and that no provision of the agreement and perhaps even no
provision of the chosen New York law violates the public policy (ordre
public) or other similar principles of the foreign law.'
The opinions of foreign counsel on the due organization and valid existence of the borrower, on the due authorization of the agreement by the
borrower, and on the authority of signing officers of the borrower are
given exclusively under the foreign law. However, apart from these elements, a court in the borrower's country will apply foreign law only to
1. See Meyrier, Legal Opinions in FinancialTransactionsInvolving Foreign Law,

13 INT'L Bus. LAw. 410 (1985).
2. See id. at 410-11; cf.Gruson, American Lawyers and Legal Opinions of Foreign
Counsel, 1975 ANN. PRoc. FORDHAM CORP. L. INsT. 296.
3. Gruson, Rechtswahlklauseln in Handelsvertragenin New York, 29 REcHT DER
INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 393, 400 (1983); see also Gruson, Controlling Choice
of Law, in SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAGING LEGAL RISK 66 (M. Gruson & R.
Reisner eds. 1984) [hereinafter Controlling Choice of Law].
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one aspect of the issue of the legality, validity and binding nature of an
agreement governed by a law other than the foreign law: whether and to
what extent the governing law clause of the agreement is valid and effective under the lex fori. To the extent that the governing law clause is
valid and effective, the court will apply New York law. Apart from issues of the due organization of the borrower and the like, foreign counsel's opinion in effect is limited to the one issue which is determined
under the foreign law."
This interpretation of the meaning of foreign counsel's opinion parallels the New York conflict-of-laws rule on governing law clauses. The
rule requires two levels of inquiry: (1) whether the stipulation of law by
the parties to the agreement is valid and (2) if the clause is valid,
whether a provision of the agreement or a rule of the chosen law applicable to the agreement violates an important New York public policy.'
Such a violation limits the effectiveness of the clause and a qualification
of counsel's opinion is in order. The conflict-of-laws rules of other countries generally follow the same pattern." Under the laws of some countries, however, the enforcement of an otherwise effective governing law
clause is not only limited by an "important" public policy but by any
public policy (ordre public) or even by certain mandatory rules of law.
In the end, foreign counsel is asked to make a sweeping statement
which in effect has a very limited, though important, meaning, namely
that the governing law clause is valid. The failure to appreciate this
point may cause United States counsel and foreign counsel to spend
much time discussing the opinion, which means something else than it
appears to mean at first glance. To avoid misunderstanding, it would be
better to replace the somewhat misleading "legal, valid, binding and en-

4. Sometimes foreign counsel is permitted in his opinion to make the strange assumption that the agreement in question is governed by the foreign law (and not by the governing New York law). This opinion is useless because it is rendered on a nonexisting

agreement and analyzes the agreement under a law which the foreign court will not
apply if the governing law clause is valid. In other cases, foreign counsel has been per-

mitted to assume that the law of New York is not different from the foreign law. This
opinion is equally useless because it also requires foreign counsel to analyze the agree-

ment under the foreign law which the foreign court will not apply to the agreement if the
governing law clause is valid. An opinion of foreign counsel assuming that foreign law

applies to the agreement would make sense only in a case where the governing law
clause in its entirety is invalid under foreign law.

5. See generally Gruson, GoverningLaw Clauses in Commercial Agreements - New

York's Approach, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323 (1979).
6. See Response to U.S. Opinion Requests, supra note *.
7. As to the terms "mandatory" or "dispositive" rules of law, see Gruson, supra note

5, at 340 n.49.
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forceable in accordance with its terms" opinion of foreign counsel with a
more precisely phrased opinion.
The "legal, valid and binding" opinion of foreign counsel also implies
that under the foreign law the borrower is a corporation duly organized
and validly existing, that all necessary corporate actions have been taken
to authorize the agreement and that the officers who executed and delivered the agreement were duly authorized. Because foreign counsel customarily gives specific opinions on these points it is not necessary to rely
with respect to these conclusions on the umbrella of the "legal, valid and
binding" formula.
II.

A.

SUGGESTED PHRASING OF OPINIONS

Opinion on the Validity of the Governing Law Clause

Assume that a New York lender asks German counsel of the borrower, a German corporation, to give an opinion under German law on
the Credit Agreement. First, foreign counsel should state that the governing law clause is valid under German law by saying:
(1) The governing law clause, subjecting the Credit Agreement to New
York law, is valid under German law.
If foreign counsel opines on the validity or effect of a provision which
is part of an agreement governed by a law other than his foreign law, he
will usually base his opinion on the assumption that such provision is
valid and effective under the governing law. This assumption, however,
is neither necessary nor appropriate when the opinion addresses the validity and effectiveness of the governing law clause. The courts of foreign
counsel's country will most likely apply only their own conflict-of-laws
rules in determining the validity and effect of the governing law clause.
They might recognize and give effect to a governing law clause even in a
case when the courts sitting in the jurisdiction of the chosen law (in our
example, New York) would not.8
Next, foreign counsel should explain the rule of foreign law that limits
the effect of a generally valid governing law clause. In the hypothetical
situation this explanation might read:
(2) Under German law, New York law will be applied to an agreement,
such as the Credit Agreement, which under German law has been validly
subjected to New York law, except to the extent that (a) any of the terms
of such agreement or any of the provisions of New York law applicable to
8. See Yntema, 'Autonomy' in Choice of Law, 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 341, 356 (1952);
cf Controlling Choice of Law, supra note 3, at 63 (N.Y. courts apply their own rules).
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such agreement are obviously irreconcilable with important principles of
German law, (b) there are mandatory provisions of German law which
must be applied to the transaction covered by the Credit Agreement irrespective of the law which governs the Credit Agreement or (c) all elements
of the transaction covered by the Credit Agreement, other than the choice
of law, are connected with only one country at the time of the choice of
law and there are mandatory provisions of the law of such country applicable to the transaction. 9

9. The principle that the parties to a commercial agreement are free to choose the
law applicable to such agreement and the exceptions to that principle are set forth in the
Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Internationalen Privatrechts, 1986 Bundesgesetzblatt I

1142 (W. Ger.), which was enacted on July 25, 1986. This statute amends and restates
the conflict-of-laws provisions of the Einfilhrungsgesetz zum Bfirgerlichen Gesetzbuch

(Introductory Law to the Civil Code).
The relevant provisions of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code, as amended, read
as follows:
Article 6. Public Policy (ordre public).
A provision of law of another country shall not be applied if its application
would lead to a result which is obviously irreconcilable with important principles
of German law. In particular, it shall not be applied if its application is irreconcilable with Basic Rights [set forth in the German Constitution].
Article 34. Mandatory Provisions.
This subpart [concerning contractual obligations - i.e., Arts. 27-37] does not
prejudice the application of those mandatory provisions of German law which
must be applied to elements of a transaction irrespective of the law which governs
the agreement.
Article 27. Free Choice of Law.
(1) The agreement is subject to the law chosen by the parties...
(3) If at the time of the choice of law all other elements of a transaction [i.e.,
other than the choice of law] are connected with only one country, the choice by
the parties of the law of another country - even if accompanied by the choice of
the jurisdiction of a court of another country - cannot prejudice the application of
those provisions [of the law of the former, connected country] which cannot be
derogated from by contract pursuant to the law of the former country (mandatory
rules).
The relationship between article 6 and article 34 of the revised Introductory Law to
the Civil Code is not entirely clear. It has been argued that article 34 contains a specific
public policy reservation for contractual obligations and is a lex specialis to article 6
which sets forth the general principle. See PALANDT, BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH
2270-71 (46th ed. 1987). Opinion clause (2) is based on the cautious view that both
articles may apply to a contractual governing law clause. Should it be clearly established
at a later time that article 6 does not apply to contractual governing law clause opinion
clause (2) must be modified.
The history of the revisions of the German conflict-of-laws rules is discussed in Bernhardt, Die Neuregelung des InternationalenPrivatrechts, 1986 DER BETRIEB 2009,
2009-10.
Opinions rendered by German counsel prior to the 1986 amendments were phrased
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Next, foreign counsel should state that the limitations mentioned in
opinion clause (2) are not present in the agreement under consideration.
If, again, a German lawyer was foreign counsel, the opinion would read:
(3) (a) None of the terms of the Credit Agreement is irreconcilable with
important principles of German law, (b) there are no mandatory provisions of German law which must be applied to the transaction covered by
the Credit Agreement irrespective of the law which governs the Credit
Agreement and (c) the transaction covered by the Credit Agreement was
not connected with only one country at the time of the choice of law.10
Limitations (a) and (b) in clause (2) are expressions of German public
policy.. Limitation (c) reflects a limitation on the freedom of the parties
to chose a law in the absence of a relationship between the transaction
and the country the law of which was chosen. If a provision of the
Credit Agreement violates German public policy, for example, an important principle of German law or a relevant rule of mandatory German
law, German counsel should mention such provision and describe how
the public policy limits the application of such provision. If the transaction is connected only with a country other than the country of the chosen law, German counsel should point out this fact. If this country is
Germany, German counsel should mention the mandatory provisions of
German law applicable to the transaction covered by the Credit Agreement. If this country is a country other than Germany, German counsel
is probably not in a position to mention the mandatory provisions of the
law of such country because he does not know them. United States counsomewhat simpler, as follows:
(1) The governing law clause, subjecting the Credit Agreement to New York
law, is valid under German law.
(2) Under German law, New York law will be applied to an agreement, such as
the Credit Agreement, which under German law has been validly subjected to
New York law, except to the extent that any of the terms of such agreement or
any of the provisions of New York law applicable to such agreement violate German public policy or the purpose of a German statute reflecting such public
policy.
(3) None of the terms of the Credit Agreement violates German public policy or
the purpose of a German statute reflecting such public policy.
This opinion was based on Article 30 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code
(Einfilhrungsgesetzzum Bfirgerlichen Gesetzbuch), which provided that: "[Non-applicable Foreign Law; "ordre public"]. The application of a foreign law is precluded if such
application would violate the public policy ("gute Sitten") or the purpose of a German
statute ("Zweck eines deutschen Gesetzes")."
10. If the opinion is issued at the time of execution and delivery of the Credit Agreement, subclause (3)(c) might read: "(c) the transaction covered by the Credit Agreement
is not connected to only one country."
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sel must then consider whether an opinion from a lawyer admitted in
such country should be obtained.
In many countries other than Germany, the limitations to the application of a validly chosen foreign law are less complicated. Under the laws
of such countries the effect of a generally valid governing law clause is
limited only by the "public policy", "international public policy" or
"public policy or good morals" of the respective country. Clauses (2) and
(3) in opinions rendered under the law of such countries read as follows:
(2) Under [country X] law, New York law will be applied to an agreement, such as the Credit Agreement, which under [country X] law has
been validly subjected to New York law, except to the extent that any of
the terms of such agreement or any of the provisions of New York law
applicable to such agreement violate [country X] [public policy] [international public policy] [public policy or good morals].(3) None of the terms
of the Credit Agreement violates [country X] [public policy] [international
public policy] [public'policy or good morals].
This article refers in several places to "the public policy or similar principles of the foreign law of the foreign counsel's country" to indicate the
substance of such limitations."'
The above opinion leaves one obvious gap: the opinion does not address the issue of whether there are any provisions of New York law
which are not reflected in the provisions of the Agreement that are irreconcilable with important principles of German law or contrary to
mandatory provisions of German law which must be applied to the
transaction covered by the Credit Agreement irrespective of the law
which governs the Credit Agreement. By subjecting an agreement to
New York law, certain provisions of New York law will be applicable to
the agreement because New York law is incorporated into the agreement
by virtue of the governing law clause. This incorporation holds for
mandatory rules as well as for dispositive rules of New York law. A
court in foreign counsel's country will, therefore, have to determine, in
accordance with its own conflict-of-laws rules, whether it will apply the
relevant provisions of New York law in accordance with the governing
law clause. In the hypothetical example, a German court will have to
determine whether any rule of New York law incorporated into the
Credit Agreement is irreconcilable with important principles of German
law or contrary to mandatory provisions of German law which must be
applied to the transaction covered by the Credit Agreement irrespective

11.

See Response to U.S. Opinion Requests, supra note *, at 90-92.
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of the law which governs the Credit Agreement.1 2 If a court in the foreign counsel's country rejects a rule of New York law because that rule
is irreconcilable with important principles of German law or contrary to
mandatory provisions of German law which must be applied to the
transaction covered by the Credit Agreement irrespective of the law
which governs the Credit Agreement, the rejection limits the effectiveness
of the governing law clause, with the result that the foreign court will
construe the Credit Agreement differently than a court sitting in New
York.
To assure the recipient of the opinion that such a gap does not exist
when the courts of the foreign counsel's country apply the governing law
to the Credit Agreement, foreign counsel would have to give an unqualified opinion as to the compatibility of the governing law applicable to the
Agreement with the public policy or similar principles of the foreign
law. But foreign counsel will probably not give such an opinion because
this opinion requires a knowledge of all rules of the governing law which
may apply to the Agreement. In fact, the hypothetical foreign counsel
would have to be both a New York and a German lawyer.1 3 If foreign
counsel is very familiar with the loan transactions governed by New
York law, he may be willing to opine that he is not aware of any rule of
New York law applicable to the Agreement which violates the public
policy or similar principles of the foreign law of the foreign counsel's
country.
There is no way to close completely that gap in the opinion puzzle.1"
To be sure, the practical implications of the problem are small. However, it ought to be clear, even if not expressly stated, that the opinion
which foreign counsel gives with respect to the validity and enforceability
of an agreement under foreign law is limited to an opinion on the valid-

12. See Articles 6 and 34 of the Introductory Law to the German Civil Code, as
amended, supra note 9.
13. Since the opinion gap becomes apparent from a reading of opinion clauses (2)
and (3), it is not necessary for foreign counsel to expressly qualify his opinion by stating
that he does not express an opinion on whether any provision of the stipulated law applicable to the agreement violates a public policy or similar principle of the foreign law (of
foreign counsel's country).
14. In some instances it may be possible for foreign counsel to obtain an opinion
from New York counsel stating foreseeably important rules of the chosen New York law
which apply to the agreement in question and which could - in New York counsel's
view - violate the public policy or similar principles of foreign law because of their
impact on the rights and duties of the parties to the agreement in question. Foreign
counsel can then opine, based on the New York opinion, whether these rules in fact
violate the public policy of his foreign law. Cf ControllingChoice of Law, supra note 3,
at 67 (similar advice to N.Y. counsel, if foreign law governs).
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ity and enforceability of the agreement as its terms appear on its face,
that is, without reference to the general body of law incorporated into
the agreement by the governing law clause. This is another reason why
international agreements should be detailed and complete.
There is a second gap. The opinion that the terms of the Credit
Agreement do not violate a public policy or similar principle of the foreign law requires an understanding of the terms of the Credit Agreement. An agreement can only be fully understood if read with a knowledge of the governing law because the governing law determines the
meaning of the provisions of the agreement. Foreign counsel, however,
does not know the governing law. In the case of opinions rendered in
interstate transactions involving sister states of the United States, it has
been suggested that counsel from one state should assume that the agreement is governed by his law rather than by the governing sister state
law. This approach may not bring to light violations of the public policy
of the opining lawyer's state, but it may still have some merit where
sister states of the United States with substantially similar legal systems
are involved. This approach makes no sense, however, where foreign
countries are involved. Because of the difference in law and contract
practice it would be ludicrous to suggest to a lawyer from a civil-law
country or even from a non-United States common-law jurisdiction to
read a New York law agreement as if it were governed by his law. All
one can reasonably expect from a foreign counsel rendering an opinion
on an agreement governed by the law of a state of the United States is
that he is familiar with the English language and United States legal
terminology and that he is experienced in international transactions of
the type reflected in the agreement. Foreign counsel's opinion that the
agreement does not violate a public policy or similar principles of foreign
law is based on a reading of the agreement with this background.1"
For a better understanding, let us assume, that the situation is the
other way around, namely the Credit Agreement is subject to German
law and the lender asks a New York lawyer to render an opinion as
foreign counsel. Clauses (1), (2) and (3) of the opinion would then read:
(1) The governing law clause, subjecting the Credit Agreement to German
law, is valid under New York law.
(2) Under New York law, German law will be applied to an agreement,
such as the Credit Agreement, which under New York law has been val15.

The same issue arises in connection with the customarily requested opinion that

the execution, delivery and performance of an agreement does not require any govern-

mental approvals and does not violate any contractual obligations or the charter and by-

laws or similar documents of a party thereto.
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idly subjected to German law, except to the extent that any of the terms of

such agreement or any of the provisions of German law applicable to such
agreement violate an important public policy of New York.
(3) None of the terms of the Credit Agreement violates an important public policy of New York.
One gap which is left uncovered by this opinion relates to the provisions
of German law applicable to the Credit Agreement which are not reflected in the Credit Agreement. A New York lawyer will not be in a
position to opine that none of these provisions of German law violates an
important public policy of New York. The other gap relates to the New
York lawyer's ability to fully understand the implications of the German
law Credit Agreement when determining whether any term of the
Agreement violates an important public policy of New York.
B.

Opinion on Enforcement and Remedies

If foreign counsel gives the opinions suggested above, the recipient of
the opinions knows that a foreign court will apply New York law to the
agreement. If foreign counsel makes exceptions with respect to certain
provisions of the Credit Agreement or of the governing law, the recipient
knows that there are certain limits to the application of the governing
law to the Credit Agreement by a court of the foreign country. The recipient does not receive assurance, however, that there will be remedies
available in the foreign country. He will miss the express and positive
statement that the agreement is enforceable in the foreign courts.
"Enforceability" of an agreement means that remedies will be available to a party to such agreement if certain requirements are met. "Availability of remedies" means for the United States lawyer the following:
[1]f there is a default in performance of an obligation (1) if a failure to
pay or other damage can be shown and (2) if the defaulting party can be
brought into a court which will hear the case and apply the governing
law, then, subject to the availability of defenses and the exceptions stated
in the opinion [presumably the bankruptcy and equitable remedies exceptions],' the court will provide a money damage (or perhaps injunctive or

16. The terms "bankruptcy exception" and "equitable principles limitation" are used
in this article as shorthand descriptions for qualifications of the remedies opinion.
The bankruptcy exception contains the warning that a court might refuse to give some
remedy because of "bankruptcy, insolvency or other similar laws affecting the enforcement of creditors' rights in general." Special Committee on Legal Opinions in Commer-

cial Transactions, New York County Lawyers' Association, in Co-operation with Corporation Law Committee, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and
Corporation Law Committee of the Banking, Corporation and Business Law Section,
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specific performance) remedy.'"
According to the Tribar Report,"8 this statement about enforceability is
contained in three phrases which have the same meaning: the agreement

is legal, valid and binding, the agreement is legal, valid, binding and
enforceable and the agreement is legal, valid, binding and enforceable
in accordance with its terms. Another view, however, holds that "enforceable in accordance with its terms" means that the court will hear
arguments for specific performance or injunctive relief and that the deletion of the words "in accordance with its terms" indicates that only
money damages are available.1 9
Foreign counsel could properly ask why he should give an opinion as

to enforceability under foreign law (whether that opinion is included in
the word "binding" or in the word "enforceable" or in the words "enforceable according to its terms") if the meaning of that opinion is not
even clear to the United States recipient. In addition, the above quoted

interpretation of the opinion as to enforceability enumerates various assumptions which are not reflected in the language of the enforceability

opinion. A refusal by foreign counsel to give any enforceability opinion
would not be very helpful; the opinion-giving process is not an adversarial process, it is a process of cooperation between principal counsel
and foreign counsel. The United States lawyer with his less abstract,
more result-oriented way of thinking, with his procedural approach to

the law, will insist on some assurance as to enforceability. What can
foreign counsel offer? Foreign counsel, in our German example, could

say:
(4) Assuming that the Credit Agreement is legal, valid, binding and enforceable under New York law,20 the Credit Agreement is enforceable in

New York State Bar Association, Legal Opinions to Third Parties;An EasierPath, 34
Bus. LAW. 1891, 1917 (1979) [hereinafter Tribar Report]; see also An Addendum Legal Opinions to Third Parties:An Easier Path, 36 Bus. LAw. 429 (1981) [hereinafter Addendum]. The equitable principles limitation makes the opinion recipient aware of
the fact that the enforceability of the obligations under the agreement is subject to general
principles of equity (regardless of whether such enforceability is considered in a proceeding in equity or at law). This means that courts might apply a "test of reasonableness
...in some situations to dilute the effect of the literal language of an obligation." In
aggravated situations it seems likely that the courts will act to provide some relief to the
obligor. Tribar Report, supra note 16, at 1918.
17. Tribar Report, supra note 16, at 1914.
18. See id. at 1915-16.
19. See id. at 1916.
20. In lieu of the assumption, foreign counsel could rely on an opinion of New York
counsel that the agreement is legal, valid, binding and enforceable under New York law.
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accordance with its terms, the rules of the German law of civil procedure
and, subject to the opinions set forth in clauses (1) through (3), the applicable provisions of the chosen law of New York, except that the enforceability of the Credit Agreement may be limited by bankruptcy, insolvency,
reorganization, moratorium or similar laws affecting the enforceability of
creditors' rights generally.
This statement is more helpful and precise than the abstract statement
that the agreement "is enforceable." However, foreign counsel might still
be troubled by the dispute as to the meaning of the word "enforceable."
Should he not enlarge his opinion and say exactly what the Tribar Report thinks he is saying? The enlarged statement would read:
(4) In the event that a party to the Credit Agreement breaches the Credit
Agreement, and if (i) the other party suffers damages because of such
breach, (ii) the breaching party can be subjected to the jurisdiction of a
German court which will hear the case, and (iii) the Credit Agreement is
legal, valid, binding and enforceable under New York law, then, subject to
the availability of defenses, such court will provide some remedy to the
injured party in accordance with the terms of the Credit Agreement, the
rules of the German law of civil procedure and, subject to the opinions set
forth in clauses (1) through (3), the applicable provisions of the chosen
law of New York, except that the enforceability of the Credit Agreement
may be limited by bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization, moratorium or
similar laws affecting the enforceability of creditors' rights generally.
Foreign counsel need make no qualification in the opinion with respect to equitable principles or the principles of fairness and good faith.
If these principles under foreign law are embodied in procedural rules,
the above opinion language covers them. If these principles are substantive rules of the foreign law, the foreign court generally would not apply
them because, in the opinion of foreign counsel, the agreement contains a
valid governing law clause. A court would apply such equitable rules of
substantive law only to the extent they reflect a public policy or similar
principle of law and thereby limit the application of the chosen law to
the Credit Agreement. In the latter case, foreign counsel would probably
have made an exception in clause (3) of the proposed opinion (if such
limitation relates to a provision of the Credit Agreement or a rule of the
applicable governing law of which foreign counsel is aware).
The proposal for a reformulation of the legal opinions of foreign counsel is radical in form but conservative in substance. The proposed opinion says in plain, deciphered language what the highly stylized words of
the typical United States opinion intend to say. If a foreign counsel responds to a United States opinion request with the proposed opinion, an
inexperienced United States counsel might insist on the time-honored
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"legal, valid, binding and enforceable" language. If foreign counsel then
asks: "What do the words which you request mean?" United States
counsel will either not know the answer or give the same interpretation
given in this article. If United States counsel has a different understanding, for example, as to the meaning of the word "enforceable," foreign
counsel and United States counsel can deal with this understanding in an
open and rational way.
C.

Opinion as to the Availability of a Forum

Opinions do not usually speak expressly about the availability of a
forum. If an agreement governed by New York law contains an exclusive
or nonexclusive jurisdiction clause providing for jurisdiction in New
York, the "legal, valid and binding" opinion given by New York counsel
covers the validity of that clause under New York law.2" A separate
opinion by foreign counsel as to the availability of jurisdiction over the
borrower in the borrower's country might be appropriate because the
chosen New York law probably does not govern the issue of jurisdiction
in the borrower's country but, rather, the lexfori of the borrower's country does. 2 It would be appropriate for foreign counsel, in our example,
German counsel, to give an opinion as follows:
The [named German] court has jurisdiction over the borrower in an action
by the lender arising under the Credit Agreement.
This opinion would be based on general German principles of jurisdiction or on a contractual submission by the borrower to jurisdiction in
Germany.
If the agreement contains a jurisdiction clause giving New York exclusive jurisdiction, the German opinion should cover the validity of such
clause under the German lex fori. The purpose of this opinion is to ascertain whether and to what extent a German court accepts the "ouster"
of its jurisdiction by virture of an exclusive jurisdiction clause. An opinion by German counsel that the Credit Agreement is legal, valid, binding
and enforceable or that the governing law clause is valid would be of
secondary importance in that case because a German court would never
hear a case involving the Credit Agreement except under very special
circumstances, such as bankruptcy of the borrower.
21. See generally Gruson, ControllingSite of Litigation, in SOVEREIGN LENDING:
MANAGING LEGAL RISK 29 (M. Gruson & R. Reisner eds. 1984) [hereinafter Controlling Site of Litigation]; Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 133.
22. Cf ControllingSite of Litigation, supra note 21, at 39-41.
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Opinion on Enforcement of Judgments

The opinion of foreign counsel that a contract subject to a law other
than the foreign law is legal, valid and binding under the foreign law,
does not mean that a judgment obtained in the courts of the jurisdiction
chosen by the parties in the agreement would be enforceable in the borrower's country. An opinion as to the enforceability of a foreign judgment or arbitration award, although potentially of interest and value, is
frequently not requested and if requested would have to be rendered
expressly.
Further, an opinion as to the enforceability of a hypothetical judgment
or award to be rendered in the future should be very limited and should
not amount to much more than a recitation of statutes and general principles of the foreign law. If foreign counsel is a German lawyer he might
say:
Any final and conclusive judgment for a definite sum of the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, New York County, or of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York rendered in a
suit, action or proceeding against the borrower arising out of the Credit
Agreement should be enforceable against the borrower by courts of the
Federal Republic of Germany, provided that the requirements of Section
328 of the German Code of Civil Procedure are met. 3
It may be possible for foreign counsel to render favorable opinions that
some of the requirements to Section 328 of the German Code of Civil
Procedure would be met on the date of the opinion. These opinions
might address the issues of (1) whether German law would recognize the
jurisdiction of the courts which will render the hypothetical judgment (in
our example, the New York Supreme Court and the United States Dis23. Section 328 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung)
reads:
[Recognition of Foreign Judgments]
(1) The recognition of the judgment of a foreign court is precluded:
1. if the courts of the state in which the foreign court is sitting lack jurisdiction
according to German law;
2. if the defendant against whom a judgment was rendered is German and he did
not enter an appearance in court, and if he was not served with the summons or
other court order initiating the proceedings either in the state in which the court is
sitting or by way of German judicial assistance;
3. [relevant for family law matters only];
4. if the recognition of the judgment would violate the public policy or the purpose
of a German statute;
5. if reciprocity is not assured.

(2) [irrelevant].
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trict Court for the Southern District of New York) - an issue which
should not be difficult to resolve when the jurisdiction is based on a submission clause contained in the Credit Agreement - and (2) whether
reciprocity exists with respect to the recognition and enforcement of
judgments (in our example, between Germany and New York).24
If one reverses the roles and assumes that a New York lawyer were
asked to give an opinion as to the enforceability in New York of a hypothetical German judgment for a sum of money, he might opine as
follows:
A German judgment which is a "foreign country judgment" as defined in
Section 5301(b) of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules (the CPLR)
and which is final, conclusive and enforceable in Germany is enforceable
in New York in accordance with Section 5303 of the CPLR, even though
an appeal therefrom is pending or it is subject to appeal, except as provided in Section 5304 of the CPLR.25

24. See generally 1 R.

GEIMER & R. SCHOTZE, INTERNATIONALE
1681-747 (1984).
25. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 5301-5304 (McKinney 1978):
§ 5301. Definitions.
As used in this article the following definitions shall be applicable.
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(b) Foreign country judgment. "Foreign country judgment" in this article means
any judgment of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money,
other than a judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a judgment for support
in matrimonial or family matters.
§ 5302. Applicability.
This article applies to any foreign country judgment which is final, conclusive
and enforceable where rendered even though an appeal therefrom is pending or it
is subject to appeal.
§ 5303. Recognition and enforcement.
Except as provided in section 5304, a foreign country judgment meeting the
requirements of section 5302 is conclusive between the parties to the extent that it
grants or denies recovery of a sum of money. Such a foreign judgment is enforceable by an action on the judgment, a motion for summary judgment in lieu of
complaint, or in a pending action by counterclaim, crossclaim or affirmative
defense.
§ 5304. Grounds for non-recognition.
(a) No recognition. A foreign country judgment is not conclusive if:
1. the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirement of due
process of law;
2. the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
(b) Other grounds for nonrecognition. A foreign country judgment need not be
recognized if:
1. the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter;
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CONCLUSION

An opinion delivered as a condition precedent to the effectiveness of an
agreement serves the purpose of assuring the opinion recipient of the
correctness of the legal assumptions on which he bases his decision
whether or not to enter into the agreement. In case of a transborder
agreement, the laws of more than one country apply to various aspects of
the transaction even if the agreement contains an express governing law
clause, and the opinions of lawyers from the relevant countries must, if
read together, cover all important legal issues. On the other hand, each
lawyer must limit his opinion to his law and with respect to issues governed by other laws either remain silent, make certain assumptions or
rely on a foreign lawyer's opinion.
The United States bar has only in recent years begun to think about
and question the time-honored language used by United States lawyers
in their opinions. 2' Little thought has been given to the explanation and
justification of the language customarily requested by United States lawyers from foreign counsel involved in an international transaction. Foreign counsel has usually been requested to give opinions which follow
the traditional United States practice. This practice is questionable in
the case of opinions rendered on agreements governed by a law other
than the law of the lawyer rendering the opinion.
This article suggests that the foreign lawyer should clearly state the
issues which are to be determined under his law and which are covered
by his opinion. In particular, he should not opine that an agreement
2. the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice
of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
3. the judgment was obtained by fraud;
4. the cause of action on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the
public policy of this state;
5. the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;
6. the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between
the parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than
by proceedings in that court; or
7. in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court
was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.
26. See, e.g., Babb, Barnes, Gordon & Kjellenberg, Legal Opinions to Third Parties
in Corporate Transactions, 32 Bus. LAw. 553 (1977); Fuld, Legal Opinions in Business Transactions- An Attempt to Bring Some Order out of Some Chaos, 28 Bus. LAW.
915 (1973); Business Law Section of the State Bar of California, Report of the Committee on Corporations Regarding Legal Opinions in Business Transactions (1982);
Tribar Report, supra note 16; Subcommittee on Opinion Writing of the Massachusetts
Bar Association, Omnibus Opinionfor Use in Loan Transactions, 60 MAss. L.Q. 193
(1976).
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which is governed by a law other than his law is "legal, valid and binding"; he should only opine that the governing law clause in the agreement is effective under his law.

